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ABSTRACT 
 In Mobile ad-hoc network, nodes must cooperate to achieve the routing purposes. Node misbehaviour 
due to selfish or malicious intention could significantly degrade the performance of MANET because 
most existing routing protocols in MANET are aiming at finding most efficiency path.  
In this paper, we propose a Two node-disjoint Routes protocol for Isolating Dropper Node in MANET 
(TRIDNT) to deal with misbehaviour in MANET. TRIDNT allows some degree of selfishness to give an 
incentive to the selfish nodes to declare itself to its neighbours, which reduce the misbehaving nodes 
searching time. In TRIDNT two node-disjoint routes between the source and destination are selected 
based on their trust values. We use both DLL-ACK and end-to-end TCP-ACK to monitor the behaviour of 
routing path nodes: if a malicious behaviour is detected then the path searching tool starts to identify the 
malicious nodes and isolate them. Finally by using a mathematical analysis we find that our proposed 
protocol reduces the searching time of malicious nodes comparing to the route expected life time, and 
avoids the isolated misbehaving node from sharing in all future routes, which improve the overall 
network throughput. 
KEYWORDS 
 Ad Hoc Network – Trust-Based routing – Secure Routing Protocol – network security. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is an infrastructure-less network, consisting of a set of 
mobile nodes without any support of base stations or access points. The mobile nodes are free 
to change their position with any speed and at any time, and they play the role of terminals and 
routers allowing hop by hop communication among nodes outside wireless transmission range. 
For lack of network infrastructure, the nodes have to communicate cooperatively. Cooperation 
at the network layer means routing and forwarding packets. Some nodes may deviate from the 
protocol for selfish or malicious reasons, these nodes are called misbehaving nodes.  Selfish 
nodes wish to use system services while taking an advantage of saving their resources by 
deviating from regular routing and forwarding. Malicious nodes wish to mount an attack to 
either a specific node or the network as whole. Both selfish and malicious nodes disrupt the 
routing protocol operation and reduce the network throughput. This brings up the need for 
secure routing protocols, where the Routing protocols must cope with such selfish and 
malicious behaviour.  
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Several routing protocols have been proposed in the literature (see [1], [2], [3]). These focus 
mainly on efficiency issues such as scalability with respect to network size, traffic load, 
mobility, and on the adaptability to network conditions such as link quality and power 
requirements. Some of the proposed routing algorithms also address security issues by using 
cryptographic tools to secure the routing protocol messages (e.g., [4], [5], [6], [7] for a survey, 
see [8], [9]). Recently, a new class of routing protocol has been proposed, namely trust based 
routing as in [10]. Trust based routing protocols consist of two parts: a routing part and a trust 
model, for a survey see [11]. Routing decisions are made according to the trust model. The trust 
routing protocols have to be able to identify trustworthy nodes and find a reliable and 
trustworthy route from sender to destination node. This has to be realized within a few seconds 
or better tenths of seconds, depending on the mobility of the nodes and the number of hops in 
the route. Most of the existing trust based routing protocols uses continuous promiscuous 
monitoring of the neighbours; which violate the TCP protocol rules. 
This paper focuses on Packet Dropping Attack, and presents a novel routing algorithm resistant 
to various packet dropping scenarios. Here, the malicious node tends to threaten network 
throughput through the use of packet dropping attack. This kind of attack could be even worse 
when supported by the malicious node sending link–layer acknowledgements to neighbour 
nodes to delay the detection of the attack and hence further decrease the throughput. In this 
paper, four packet dropping scenarios are considered. In Inclusive Packet Dropping, the 
malicious node simply drops all received data link layer (DLL) PDU's while positively 
acknowledging them. This attack is also called Black Hole attack [12], [13], [5]. Periodic 
Packet Dropping is used by malicious nodes to drop a small fraction of incoming DLL PDU's 
once per retransmission time out, a variant of Jellyfish (JF) attack reported in [12], [13], [14]. In 
Frequent Packet Dropping, the malicious node may possibly drop a fraction of incoming DLL 
PDU's on a random basis. In Selective Packet Dropping, the malicious node drops only these 
PDU's coming from specific source(s), going to specific destination(s), or following a specific 
route. The last two attacks are called Gray Hole attack. In all packets dropping attacks 
scenarios, the overall network throughput will deteriorate [12]. 
In our proposed scheme we establish two node-disjoint routes between the source and 
destination nodes, these routes have the highest path trust values; to route around misbehaving 
nodes; one is marked as primary and the other as secondary. Unlike all previous research efforts 
made to tolerate Packet Dropping Attacks, our work allow some degree of node selfishness; to 
save their resources partially; and detect the malicious activity faster. We use both DLL-ACK 
and end-to-end TCP-ACK as monitoring tools; without continuous promiscuous monitoring of 
the neighbours; and when detecting a malicious activity a new path searching technique is used 
to identify the malicious or compromised nodes in the routing path and isolate them. Based on 
this claim, the proposed scheme detect the misbehaving node and avoids it from sharing in all 
future routes in a few seconds lower than the route expected life time, resulting in an improved 
overall throughput performance for the network. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, describes the related work. The 
network assumptions and the TRIDNT operation are presented in Section 3.  A time taken to 
detect the malicious node in the routing path is calculated in section 4, and the performance 
result is presented in section 5. Finally we conclude our work and discuss our plan for future 
work in section 6. 
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2. RELATED WORK 
In [15] Marti et al. proposed a mechanism called as watchdog and pathrater on DSR to detect 
the misbehaving nodes in MANETs. The approach introduces two extensions to DSR: A 
watchdog detects misbehaving nodes, by maintaining a buffer of transmitted packets and 
overhearing of other node forwarding. It compares each overheard packet with the packets in 
the buffer to see if there is a match. If so, the packet in the buffer is removed and forgotten by 
the watchdog, since it has been forwarded on. If a packet has remained in the buffer for longer 
than a certain timeout, the watchdog increments a failure tally for the node responsible for 
forwarding on the packet. If the tally exceeds a certain threshold bandwidth, it determines that 
the node is misbehaving and sends a message to the source notifying it of the misbehaving 
node. A pathrater avoids routing packets through the detected malicious nodes.  Each node 
estimates a link metric with respect to the reliability of links and knowledge about misbehaving 
nodes. A node assigns this metric to every other known node and periodically updates the 
metric. The downside of their method is that they cannot distinguish the misbehaving nodes 
from node failures. An honest node can easily be rated malicious if the transmission breaks up. 
CONFIDANT [16] is a protocol which also attempts to detect the malicious nodes in ad hoc 
networks. Monitor, Reputation System, Path Manager and Trust Manager are the main 
components of CONFIDANT protocol. For each packet a node forwards, the monitor on that 
node attempts to ensure that the next-hop node also forwarded the packet correctly 
(overhearing). When the monitor detects an anomaly, it triggers action by the reputation system, 
which maintains a local ratings list. These lists are potentially exchanged with other nodes; the 
trust manager handles input from other nodes. Finally, the path manager chooses paths from the 
node’s route cache based on a blacklist and the local ratings list. CONFIDANT has scalability 
problems with the number of nodes. The tables maintained by the reputation system of each 
node may become huge. Also, in scenarios with very high mobility, the overhead can increase 
considerably. 
In [17] Balakrishnan et al, propose a scheme of TWOACK to prevent selfishness in mobile ad 
hoc networks. They proposed two network-layer acknowledgment-based schemes, termed the 
TWOACK and the S-TWOACK schemes, which can be simply added-on to any source routing 
protocol. When a node forwards a packet, the node’s routing agent verifies that the packet is 
received successfully by the node that is two hops away on the source route. This is done 
through the use of a special type of acknowledgment packets, termed TWOACK packets. 
TWOACK packets have a very similar functionality as the ACK packets. A node acknowledges 
the receipt of a data packet by sending back a two-hop TWOACK packet along the active 
source route. If the sender/forwarder of a data packet does not receive a TWOACK packet 
corresponding to a particular data packet that was sent out, the next-hop’s forwarding link is 
claimed to be misbehaving and the forwarding route broken. Based on this claim, the routing 
protocol avoids the accused link in all future routes, resulting in an improved overall throughput 
performance for the network. The S-TWOACK (Selective-TWOACK) scheme is a derivative 
of the basic TWOACK scheme, aimed at reducing the routing overhead caused by excessive 
number of TWOACK packets. The basic drawback of this scheme is that it can't determine 
exactly which node is the misbehaving node; it only marks the link interconnecting the two 
nodes as misbehaving link and tries to avoid using this link in future. 
Muhammad Zeshan et al, [18] proposed a two folded approach, to detect and then to isolate a 
malicious node causing packet dropping attacks. First approach will detect the misbehaviour of 
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nodes and will identify the malicious activity in network. When a Source node forwards any 
packet to the Destination through a route, all intermediate nodes will send back an ACK packet 
to its source node. If the Source node doesn't receive the ACK from any intermediate node, it 
will send again its packet for Destination after a specific time but if again this activity was 
observed, Source node will broadcast a packet to declare the malicious activity in the network. 
Then upon identification of misbehaving nodes in network other approach will isolate the 
malicious node from network. All nodes which lie in the transmission range of active route and 
also the nodes which are on the active route become in promiscuous listening mode and count 
number of packet coming into and going out of the nodes of active route. Each node in this 
range maintains a list of sent and dropped packets and when number of dropped packets by a 
particular node exceeds a certain threshold, the monitoring node in that range declares that node 
as misbehaving node. The basic drawback of this scheme is, nodes cooperate together to obtain 
an objective opinion about another node’s trustworthiness, which give the misbehaving node 
the chance to falsely report the value of trust score (False Misbehaviour). 
3. THE PROPOSED TRIDNT PROTOCOL 
In this section we describe our solution to address the Packet Dropping Attack in MANETs. 
The proposed protocol makes the first effort to distinguish between the malicious and selfish 
node, and allow a controlled degree of node selfishness. The proposed monitoring tool detects 
the malicious activity and then the path searching tool identifies the malicious or compromised 
nodes in the network and isolates them, and the proposed routing protocol routes around the 
misbehaving node. 
3.1. Network Model and Assumptions 
In this work, we assume that the MANET consist of N nodes are situated in a bounded 2-
dimensional space, within which they are free to move, and a bi-directional communication 
symmetry on every link between the nodes. For simplicity we also assume that the destination-
node is non-malicious, and any routing path contains on the average of h node has at most one 
malicious node. 
Mobile nodes in MANETs often communicate with one another through an error-prone, 
bandwidth-limited, and insecure wireless channel. We are not concerned with the security 
problem introduced by the instability of physical layer or link layer. We only assume that: (1) 
Each node in the network has the ability to discover all of its neighbours; (2) Each node in the 
network can broadcast some essential messages to its neighbours with high reliability; (3) Each 
node in the network uses its MAC address as a unique identifier (node ID); (4) Each node in the 
network have a black list containing the misbehaving nodes, a trust table containing the learned 
network nodes’ trust value; which are broadcasted to the node's neighbours periodically; and a 
Data Packet Information (DPI) cache to store information about the received and processed data 
or TCP-ACK packets. 
In the network layer, a new node model is designed as the basis of our trust model. Some new 
fields are added into a node’s routing table to store its trust value about other nodes and to 
record the positive and negative ratings when it performs routing with others. 
3.2. Operation of TRIDNT 
In TRIDNT we use AOMDV [19], or multipath DSR [20] to establish a two node-disjoints 
paths between the source and destination nodes. And with a little modification of the RREQ 
packet to contain a list of unwanted nodes, which the source node doesn't want them to be 
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members on the discovered route temporarily, also the destination node may have this list (as 
seen below) and it discard all routes which contain this unwanted nodes.  
Also during the RREQ flooding process the intermediate nodes will insert the previous node 
trust ratings in the RREQ packet if the previous node trust value T is less than the trust value 
contained in the RREQ packet. 
When the destination node receives RREQ packet from multiple nodes, it selects two node 
disjoint paths with the highest path trust value, and certainty factor and unicasts two RREPs 
(contain the path trust rating) back to the source along the selected two routing paths. We will 
take the path trust value as the minimum trust value among all links in the routing path, 
and can be calculated as: 
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Figure 1. Two node disjoint paths between S and D  
The source node marks the highest trusted route as primary used for data forwarding and the 
other as secondary used as a backup path, as shown in figure 1. The two node-disjoint routes 
are adopted to ensure reliable communication and search for malicious nodes. 
3.2.1 Controlled selfishness behaviour  
The misbehaving node may be a selfish or malicious node, selfish node will hurt the network 
connectivity and is reported as malicious node in all reported trust based routing protocols. We 
use the observation of that, there is a difference in needs of selfish and malicious nodes, where 
selfish node needs: (1) to use network resources, (2) save its resources “drop any forwarded 
packet form other nodes and don’t want to be a member in any new routes”. But the malicious 
“dropper” node needs: (1) to be a member in all new routes, (2) mount a denial of service attack 
by dropping the data packets it receives. 
Depending on the different needs of selfish and malicious nodes, we will allow some degree of 
selfishness for nodes to save their resources (e.g. battery power; where nodes behave differently 
based on their energy levels. When the energy lies between full energy E and a threshold Es, 
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the node behaves properly. For an energy level lower than the threshold Es, it uses its energy 
for transmissions of its own packets).  
A new field is inserted in the Hello packet containing the selfishness status.  Each node use this 
field in Hello packet to inform its direct neighbour nodes about its selfishness status, if it is in 
selfish mode all neighbour nodes will: 
1) Remove it from the active routes, which it is an intermediate node on it, and send Route 
Error (RERR) packet to the sources to establish new routes. 
2) Allow it to deny being a member in any new route, and dropping any Route Request 
(RREQ) packet coming from it. 
3) Forward to/from it the packets which contain it as destination/source address.   
The selfish node neighbours will restrict its selfishness behaviour by a time threshold, and a 
repetition threshold. 
By allowing some degree of node selfishness the selfish node declare itself to its neighbour, and 
malicious node will not declare itself as selfish node because of inconsistency with its needs. So 
the selfish nodes are excluded from the responsibility of data forwarding. At the same time, this 
helps in easier identification of malicious nodes. Here we can differentiate between selfish and 
malicious nodes and save the misbehaving searching time (the time to find the misbehaving 
“selfish and malicious” node, and route around them) to only a searching time to find the 
malicious node only. We known that the misbehaving searching time needs to be very small 
because; due to the node mobility; the route life time is small. 
3.2.2 Route monitoring toll 
In our approach we use the DLL-ACK and the end to end TCP-ACK as monitoring tool to 
monitor the behaviour of the routing path, then use a path searching tool to search the 
misbehaving path to find the malicious node, and then put the malicious node ID in the black 
list to isolate it. 
During the data transmission, the source node send its data packet over the primary path only 
and each node in the path store the received data packet information in its Data Packet 
Information (DPI) cache, then forward it to its downstream neighbour, and wait for a data link 
layer acknowledgment (DLL-ACK) from the neighbour node, if it did not receive data link 
layer acknowledgement; it concludes that this neighbour node should be down. In such case, the 
neighbour is excluded from the node's routing table until it becomes up. However the 
neighbour’s trust rating doesn't change. On the other hand the source node waits to receive the 
end to end TCP-ACK from the destination node via the primary and secondary paths: 
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Figure 2. The source node sends the data on the primary path only, and the destination replay 
with ACK on both primary and secondary paths 
Case I: if there is no malicious node in the primary and secondary paths, then the source node 
receive the TCP-ACK over the two routes (primary and secondary) as shown in figure 2. 
Then the source node sends a biggy back Positive Trust Update Message (PTUM) upon 
transmitting the next packet. If the each of the nodes responsible for forwarding this message 
received an acknowledgment from a neighbour node in the data link layer and through this 
neighbour in the transport layer, and received PTUM message from the source node, then each 
node in the primary path will update the trust value of its upstream and downstream neighbours, 
and remove the information about the confirmed data packet from its DPI cache.  Also 
destination node will send a biggy back PTUM message when transmitting the next TCP-ACK 
packet to the source node, to update the trust value of nodes in the secondary path.  
Case II: if the source node received an acknowledgment from a neighbour in the data link layer 
and receive an acknowledgment in the transport layer over the primary path only, even after 
retransmitting this message (TCP rules); it concludes that the neighbour node or one of its 
following nodes in the primary routing path may be malicious node trying to make blocking 
attack and send a faked TCP-ACK or there is a malicious node in the secondary routing path 
drop the TCP-ACK packet. 
Case III: if the source node received an acknowledgment from a neighbour in the data link 
layer and did not receive an acknowledgment in the transport layer over the primary or 
secondary route paths, even after retransmitting this message (TCP rules). Then the source node 
knows that the data packet doesn't reach its destination, i.e. there is a malicious node in the 
primary path trying to make blocking attack. 
In last two cases II and III the source node run the malicious search mechanism, to find the 
malicious node. 
3.2.3 Route searching mechanism 
If the source node concludes that there is a malicious node in the primary or secondary routes it 
will run the route searching mechanism by sending a Malicious Search Packet (MSP); which 
contains information about the lost data packet; via the primary route toward the destination 
node. 
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The MSP packet is a high priority packet, and every node receive this packet compare its 
information with the data packet information's stored in its DPI cache, if it found a match (the 
node received this data packet and forwarded it to the next node) it will forward the MSP 
packet to the next node with overhearing to assure that the neighbour node will forward it. The 
node which found a mismatch will stop forwarding of MSP packet and generate a Malicious 
Detection Packet "MDP (detecting node ID, detected node ID)"; it is a high priority packet 
forwarded with overhearing. Also the node which found that its downstream node doesn't 
forward the MSP packet generates the MDP packet. The node generating the MDP packet 
forwards it in the opposite direction to the detected malicious node, toward the source or 
destination node. 
We make MSP and MDP high priority packets to speed up the detection process, and forwarded 
with overhearing to avoid the malicious node to drop these packets and break the searching and 
detection process. 
Case I: if the primary path contains a malicious node, let node N be the malicious node. The 
source node sends the MSP packet to node L and overhears to be sure that node L will forward 
that packet. After comparison, node L forwards the MSP packet to M and overhears, then node 
M compares and forwards it to node N and overhears. The malicious node N has two choices:  
(1) It either, stops forwarding the MSP packet and report the destination node using MDP 
packet (N, M), that node M is the malicious node; node N deny the receiving of this 
data packet from node M. At the same time node M sure that it forwarded this data 
packet to node N and receive a DLL-ACK from node N, where it didn't overhear node 
N forward MSP packet, then node M report the source node that node N is the 
malicious node; using MDP packet (M, N) as shown in figure 3-a. 
(2) Or, it will forward the MSP packet to node O, then node O didn’t find a match in its 
DPI cache, so it will send the MDP packet (O, N) to the destination node. At the same 
time the malicious node N can inform the source node that node O don’t forward the 
MSP packet; send a MDP packet (N, O) as shown in figure 3-b. 
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(a)                                                                                (b) 
Figure 3. Malicious node N (a) don’t forward the MSP packet, (b) forward the MSP packet. 
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In both cases when the source and destination nodes; and all nodes in the routing path; receive 
the MDP packet, they will update the trust value of both the detecting and detected node 
negatively and the trust value of other nodes in the routing path positively. Because the honest 
node (node M or node O) will suffer from the misbehaviours of malicious node N, so it will 
insert the malicious node N ID in its black list regardless of its trust score to prevent any future 
cooperation with it and isolate it from the network. 
When the destination node receives the MDP packet it forwards it to the source via the 
secondary route, on the other hand if the source node doesn’t receive an MDP from the 
destination node via the secondary route it will send the received MDP from the primary route 
to it until it can discard the suspect nodes from any future selected routes to that source. Finally 
the source node  mark the secondary route as primary and start a route discovery phase to find a 
secondary node-disjoint route not containing both the detecting and detected node on it. 
Case II: if the secondary path contains a malicious node, let node H be the malicious node. The 
source node sends the MSP packet to node L, and node L forward it to node M  N  O  P 
 to the destination. When the destination node receives the MSP packet, it will be sure that 
there is no malicious node in the primary route, and then the destination node will modify the 
MSP packet to contain the information of TCP-ACK packet and forward it to node I on the 
secondary path. Node I forward it after comparison to node H (the malicious node) the 
malicious node H has the same two choices as in case I as shown in figure 4. 
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(a)                                                                                (b) 
Figure 4. Malicious node H (a) don’t forward the MSP packet, (b) forward the MSP packet. 
When any node receives the MDP packet, it will update the trust values of both the detecting 
and detected node negatively, and the trust value of other nodes in the routing path positively. 
Also the detecting node (node I or node G), will insert node N ID in its black list; regardless of 
its trust value; to reject any future cooperation between them. 
When the destination node receives the MDP packet it forwards it to the source via the primary 
route, on the other hand if the source node doesn’t receive a MDP from the destination node via 
the primary route it will send the received MDP from the secondary route to it until it can 
discard the suspect nodes from any future selected routes to that source. Finally the source node 
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starts a route discovery phase to find a secondary node disjoint route not containing both the 
detecting and detected node on it. 
Case III: if both the primary and secondary routes contain malicious nodes. The source node 
sends the MSP packet via the primary path and waits the MDP packet, if: 
The primary path malicious node send the MDP packet (N, O) to the source node, on the other 
hand the destination node receive an MDP packet (O, N) from node O, then it will forward it to 
the source node via the secondary path. If the secondary path malicious node forward the MDP 
packet (O, N),  then the source node receive the MDP packet (O, N) and mark the secondary 
path as primary and search for new secondary path don’t contain both the detecting and 
detected nodes (M, N), as shown in figure 5-a. Because the new primary route contain also a 
malicious node, then the source node don’t receive TCP-ACK packet from the destination, so it 
start a new malicious search procedure to find the malicious node. When finding the new 
malicious node the source node marks the new secondary route as primary and search a new 
secondary route, and so on. 
The primary path detecting node send the MDP packet (O, N) to the destination node, then the 
destination node send the MDP packet (O, N) to the source node via the secondary path. Figure 
5-b shown that there is a malicious node in the secondary path drop the MDP packet (O, N), 
and don’t reach the source node. When node I found that node H drops the MDP packet (O, N), 
it will send a new MDP packet (I, H) to the destination node. When the source node doesn’t 
receive the MDP packet from both the primary and secondary paths, it will try to run the 
malicious search again, and if it doesn’t receive the MDP again it conclude that there are a 
malicious nodes in the primary and secondary paths. So the source node flooding a RREQ 
toward the destination node, and when the destination node receive the RREQs it delete the 
paths contains nodes (O, N, I, H) and select the two highest trusted paths.  
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(a)                                                                                (b) 
Figure 5. The source node S (a) receives the MDP packet (b) don’t receive the MDP packet. 
3.2.4 Malicious node isolation  
When a neighbor of a malicious node detect its malicious activity it will send the MDP packet 
and put the malicious node ID on its black list to isolate it. Also when the trust value of a given 
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node reduced below a given threshold δ it will be marked as misbehaving node and its ID 
inserted in the black list. 
After small number of transaction all malicious nodes’ neighbours will put its ID on their black 
lists, so the malicious node will be fully isolated from MANET. The misbehaving node can 
rejoin the network only if it moves from its location and have new neighbours (whose ask the 
old neighbours about the node reputation), and if its reported trust value is above the trust 
threshold δ. 
4. MALICIOUS SEARCHING TIME ANALYSIS 
In this part we will calculate the time required to detect the malicious node in the routing path, 
which called the malicious detection time τmd. 
In the proposed TRIDNT protocol, once the source node known that there is a malicious node 
in the routing path during the path forwarding and monitoring phase it start using the route 
searching mechanism to detect the malicious node. 
Let both primary and secondary route contains a malicious nodes (worst case), and for 
simplicity let both paths traversing the same number of h relay nodes, which represent a random 
sample of the N network node. 
Here the source node S will start to find the malicious node by sending MSP packet to the 
destination node D via the primary path, then the MSP packet will travel h links until it reach 
the destination node. The destination D will forward the MSP to the source node S over the 
secondary path to search it to find the malicious node, let the malicious node (node number h) 
drop the packet (i.e. MSP packet will travel h-1 links on the secondary path). Then node 
number h-1 will inform the destination node D that node that node h in the secondary path is the 
malicious node by sending MDP packet which travel h-1 links until it reach D and h link until it 
reach S. because both MSP and MDP are high priority packets, then it only suffer from 
propagation delay (mean node service time τs). So the overall malicious detection time of 
TRIDNT protocol is 
 
 
In [21] the node service time is calculated as the sum of duration of random back off timer , 
the duration for which the timer frozen, time of exchange RTS, CTS and ACK packets (IEEE 
802.11 MAC protocol delay), and transmission time  . Also author in [21] neglects the RTS, 
CTS time comparing to transmission time, so the expected value of node service time as in [21] 
is: 
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Where L: is the packet size. 
ω: node transmission rate. 
A(N) = pi r(n)2 : node communication area. 
r(n) : node transmission range. 
λi : effective arrival rate at a station, and the packet generation process at each node is 
an i.i.d Poisson process with rate λ,  [21]. 
Finally we have the overall malicious detection time for TRIDNT protocol is 
 
5. PERFORMANCE RESULT 
Through this performance evaluation we assume that the node transmission range r(n) =  
as stated in [21], the packet size L = 1 K bits, the node transmission rate ω = 106 bits/sec , the 
number of network nodes N = 600 nodes, the average path length h =20 nodes, and Poisson 
arrival rate at a station λ = 0.5.  
Because the random back off time equal the multiplication of random number by the slot time, 
as stated in [22], where the slot time = 20 µ Sec, and 
0 < random number < CW 
31 ≤ CW ≤ 1023 
The contention window CW starts from CWmin and increased exponential as the unsuccessful 
data packet transmission increase (collision increase), then the CW is exponentially related to 
node packet generation rate. So    = C (1- e-λ) sec. 
Where C is a constant value, we will calculate that constant as the average back off time at the 
maximum CW, so we will tack  = 10.23 (1- e-λ) m sec. 
Also will assume that the routing path have an expected life time  corresponding 
to Vmax = 30 m/sec as reported in [23], [24]. 
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Figure 6. Expected malicious search time vs. the average path length  
The expected malicious searching time versus the average path length is shown in figure 6. We 
can see that as the average path length increases the malicious node searching time increases, 
this phenomenon is expected because the malicious node searching time is directly proportional 
to the number of node in the routing path as seen in equations (2), and (4). From this figure we 
can find that TRIDNT protocol can detect the malicious node on a fraction of path life time 
 changes from 10% at low traffic to 60 % at high traffic; at 
average path length equal 15% from the total number of network nodes. Also we find that at 
medium traffic the malicious searching time has an acceptable range, so TRIDNT can find the 
malicious node in a few seconds which is lower than the expected route life time. 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
 Arrival Rate 
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 
M
al
ic
io
u
s 
Se
ar
ch
in
g 
Ti
m
e 
(S
ec
.
)
 
 
h = 10 nodes
h = 50 nodes
h = 100 nodes
 
Figure 7. Expected malicious search time vs. the node arrival rate 
Figure 7 shows the relation between the expected malicious searching time and the packet 
arrival rate. From the figure we can see that the malicious searching time increase as the arrival 
rate increase because the node service time increased as seen in equations (4). Also we can see 
that TRIDNT protocol can detect the malicious node on a fraction of path life time 
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 changes from 5% at small number of average path length to 
55% at large number of average path length; under a high traffic condition. 
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Figure 8. Expected malicious search time vs. the number of network nodes 
Figure 8 shows how the expected malicious searching time, varies with the number of network 
nodes for TRIDNT protocol. We can see that as the network node increases the malicious 
detection time increases because as the network nodes increases the node offered traffic load 
will increased which will increase the node service time as seen in equation (4). Also we can 
see that at a small number of the average path length (= 10 nodes) the malicious searching time 
increasing rate equal 0.32 ms/node, but at h =100 nodes the malicious searching time increasing 
rate equal  3.31 ms/node. This means that at small number of average path length the number of 
network node has a little impact on the malicious searching time, and this effect increased as 
the number of the average path length increased. 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we proposed a general solution to packet dropping misbehaviour in MANET. The 
solution allows monitoring, detecting, and isolating the malicious node. In TRIDNT the 
malicious node neighbours will isolate it after a few numbers of transactions. Also TRIDNT 
allows a controlled amount of node selfishness behaviour to give an incentive to the selfish 
nodes to declare its selfishness behaviour to their neighbours, to reduce the searching time of 
misbehaving nodes to search for malicious nodes only. The mathematical result show that 
TRIDNT protocol can find the malicious node in a small amount of time comparable to the 
route expected life time, especially for high dense networks with medium traffic intensity. So 
we can find an isolate the malicious node; denied access to the network; in small amount of 
time without using promiscuous listening, which results in an improved overall throughput 
performance for MANET.  
In the future we will design a trust model to calculate the node and path trust values, and define 
a trustworthy accurate threshold. Also we will simulate TRIDNT to show the results and 
effectiveness of our solution, and compare it with existing trust based routing algorithms like 
TWOACK, and Muhammad Zeshan proposed schemes. A detailed simulation evaluation will 
be conducted in terms of Routing Packet Overhead, Security Analysis, Mean Time to detect 
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dropper node, Overall Network Throughput, and Average Latency. Also we will study the 
situation when there are more than one malicious node in the route from the source and 
destination. 
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